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DEBTOR PROTECTION AT THE CLOSE OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
DOUGLASS

G. BOSHKOFF*

INTRODUCTION

Article I of the United States Constitution' authorizes Congress to
enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. Congress infrequently
exercised this constitutional authority during the Nineteenth Century. 2
Eventually, the national economy grew to a point where it required the
equitable distribution of assets and discharge of obligations which only a
national bankruptcy statute could guarantee. The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 was our first permanent federal bankruptcy legislation. This statute
remained in effect for 81 years until it was replaced by the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978.'
At various times, Congress has been receptive to suggested changes
in our bankruptcy law. Sometimes, legislative attention has been
captured by a specific issue4 or a troublesome judicial decision.' At other
times, the interest in reform has had a broader focus. The period
preceding adoption of the 1978 Code was such a time.6 The result of this
Copyright © 1994, Douglass G. Boshkoff.
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. Congress passed bankruptcy legislation in 1800, 1841, and 1867. Each statute
was the result of a financial panic. All either expired in accordance with the terms of the
legislation or were repealed with the arrival of better times. CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 9, 19, 85, 122 (1935).

3. The period is 81 years, not 80, because the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 did not
become effective until October 1, 1979.
4. As in the case of educational loans, now made partially nondischargeable by 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), this exception to discharge originated in
legislation dealing with the perceived problem of excessive defaults on educational
obligations. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, sec. 127(a),
§ 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (1976).
5. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1988) (reversing the decision in
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)).
6. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468, established a
commission to study the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and recommend changes in our
bankruptcy law. The Commission filed its report in 1973.
The ensuing debate
concerning bankruptcy policy lasted for five years. For a general discussion of the
problems prompting this major revision of our bankruptcy law, see REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-31 (1973).
(continued)
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broader focus was the most wide ranging debate on bankruptcy policy
since adoption of the 1898 Act. The statute that emerged from this
debate represented a radical break from tradition, especially with regard
to many of the rehabilitative provisions applicable to individual debtors.7
In retrospect, this break with the past may have been too pronounced
to be sustained. Creditor interest groups immediately began demanding
change, and a marked retreat from the debtor protection policy of the
1978 Code is evident in the amendments adopted in 19848 and I986. 9
Further retrenchment will occur due to the recent passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.10
This article, a revision of remarks presented at Capital University
Law and Graduate Center on March 4, 1994, reviews the development of
debtor protection policies during the past 96 years.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
The debtor protection provided by the Bankruptcy Code is often
referred to as the fresh start policy. This fresh start has a number of
components, the most important being an extensive discharge of the
debtor's financial obligations. Debates concerning discharge policy tend
to address four important issues: eligibility, exceptions, effect, and
ability to pay.
A. Eligibilityfor Discharge
There is a presumption in favor of debt relief. Section 727 mandates
that the debtor receive a discharge in a chapter 7 proceeding unless one
of ten separate grounds for denial of discharge exists."' There is no
present sentiment favoring a change in these eligibility rules. Indeed, this
is one of the most settled aspects of debtor protection policy. Almost all
of the eligibility rules have been in effect for a long time. The most
Attitudes toward bankruptcy law reform and the value of study commissions have
changed a great deal. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108
Stat. 4106, made numerous changes in our present bankruptcy statute and authorized a
two-year commission to study the Bankruptcy Code. § 603, 108 Stat. at 4197. It is not
clear what the focus of this commission's efforts will be.
7. Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J.L. & ECON. 803 (1993).

8. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333.
9. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
10. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
11. 11 U.S.C. §727 (1988).
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recent changes involve the addition of one ground for denial of discharge
in 192612 and the deletion of another in 1960."3 Eight of the ten present
objections to discharge involve either bankruptcy-related misconduct 4 or
repeated reliance on the protection of a bankruptcy discharge. 5 The
absence of legislative activity suggests that this is an area between their
interests in which both debtors and creditors believe that an appropriate
balance has been struck.
B. Exceptions to Discharge
The same tranquillity does not prevail with regard to the list of
excepted debts.
Section 523 lists twelve debts which cannot be
discharged in a chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy.
Four of these
exceptions are less than twenty years old 16 and reflect the increased
ability of special interest groups to influence bankruptcy policy. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 adds another exception."
The legislative struggle becomes even more intense when we
consider the discharge of debt in chapter 13 proceedings. One of the
most controversial actions taken in 1978 was the decision by Congress to
12. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, 44 Stat. 662. Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, the predecessor of the current 11 U.S.C. § 727, was amended ten times between
1903 and 1970. The 1903 legislation added four grounds for objecting to discharge. See
1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 14.01 (James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1978). After that,
substantive law changes other than those noted in the text were relatively minor. Id.
13. Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621, 74 Stat. 408, eliminated false
financial statements by individuals as a basis for denial of discharge. Creditors were
deliberately obtaining false financial statements so that they would be able to object to
discharge. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, 14.0114.4].
14. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(7) (dealing with misconduct).
15. § 727(a)(8), (9) (setting forth the six year rule that prohibits discharge for
debtors who were previously discharged within six years of the date of filing). The
remaining two objections involve denial of discharge to non-individual debtors,
§ 727(a)(1), and waiver, § 727(a)(10).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (involving student loans), originated in 1976 as an
amendment to the Education Act of 1965. This exception to discharge was incorporated
into § 523 in 1978. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12,
523.18. Section
523(a)(9) (discussing certain tort liabilities related to substance abuse), was added by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act § 454. Sections 523(a)(1 1) and (12)
(dealing with certain liabilities related to depository institution failure), were added by the
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2522, 104 Stat. 4789, 4865-66.
Section 523(a)(2)(c), added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
§ 307, represents such a substantial change in the law that it could well be added to the
four exceptions listed above.
17. § 221, 108 Stat. at 4129 (adding an exception for money borrowed to pay
nondischargeable federal taxes).
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create incentives for debtors to use chapter 13 instead of chapter 7.I"
Congress wanted to increase the proportion of debtors electing chapter
13. The main incentive for debtors was a broader range of discharge
provisions. Instead of trying to force debtors into chapter 13, Congress
hoped to entice debtors into this type of proceeding by limiting the
number of exceptions to discharge. Accordingly, only one of the eight
excepted debts for a chapter 7 debtor appeared in the original chapter 13
discharge.' 9 Since 1978, this number has increased to four, and one
more has been added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.20 Congress
has now decided that incentives do not work or, alternatively, that the
cost of incentives is too great. Whatever the reason, the present law
reduces reliance on enticement and places greater emphasis on coercing
the use of chapter 13.21
There is an interesting contrast in present attitudes toward eligibility
and exception issues. While eligibility restrictions are not mentioned at
all in current debates over discharge policy, additional exceptions to
discharge are constantly being proposed. The current, intense interest in
exceptions is understandable. Any tightening of eligibility standards
would be helpful to all creditors. The benefits of any new exception to
discharge are more narrowly focused on the protected class. Most
classes of excepted claims are likely to be small,22 and the fruits of
lobbying for a new exception need be shared with few other creditors.
C. Effect of Discharge
The bankruptcy discharge is neither self-executing nor completely
effective. It must be invoked by the debtor in postbankruptcy litigation.23
Furthermore, while it discharges debt, it does not completely eradicate
18.

See

TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 230-34

(1989).
19.

11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) originally excepted only marital debts nondischargeable

under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
20. Debts nondischargeable under sections 523(A)(8) and (9) and criminal
restitution payments were added by The Crime Control Act § 3621 and § 3102(A).
Section 302 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act adds an exception for criminal fines. § 302,
108 Stat. at 4132.
21. See the discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988), infra note 44.
22. § 523(a)(1) (dealing with taxes); § 523(a)(5) (dealing with marital obligations);
§ 523(a)(7) (dealing with fines and penalties); § 523(a)(8) (dealing with educational
loans); § 523(a)(9) (dealing with torts related to substance abuse); § 523(a)(11), (12)
(dealing with misconduct related to depository institution failure).
23. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (allowing discharge in bankruptcy as an
affirmative defense).
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discharged obligations. Both of these characteristics of the discharge
have created difficulties in implementing discharge policy.
Postbankruptcy litigation to collect a discharged obligation violates
the statutory injunction now provided in § 524(a)(2). However, the
protection of the discharge is lost unless the debtor appears and asserts
that the debt has been discharged.24 At one time, creditors exploited this
characteristic of the discharge by falsely alleging a nondischargeable
obligation. The debtor, incorrectly believing that the discharge was selfexecuting, failed to appear in the postbankruptcy litigation. Default
judgments were common and difficult to set aside.'
In 1970, Congress responded to this problem by requiring that
certain claims of nondischargeability be heard only by the bankruptcy
court.26 Since hearings on such claims ordinarily will occur while the
bankruptcy proceeding is still in progress and the debtor is represented
by an attorney, the likelihood of default judgments has been drastically
reduced. This reform has been effective.
The Bankruptcy Code's treatment of reaffirmation agreements has
been less successful. For many years, there was no federal regulation of
reaffirmation agreements. State law generally permitted enforcement of
a promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the
fact that there was no new consideration for the promise.27 Many
debtors, giddy with the freedom provided by the discharge, made illconsidered promises to pay their old debts.
The 1978 legislation provided an adequate remedy for this problem.
Most reaffirmation agreements were subject to several protective
requirements, including court approval. This approval was conditioned
upon a finding that the agreement did not impose "an- undue hardship"
and was "in the best interest of the debtor."2 8 This demanding standard
made it difficult to get court approval and is appropriate in most cases.
Most reaffirmations make absolutely no sense because they saddle the
24. See, e.g., Personal Indus. Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957). See generally 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT& ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (2d ed. 1990).
25. A good discussion of the events leading up to the 1970 reforms appears in Vern
C. Countryman, The New DischargeabilityLaw, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1971).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).
27. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His
DischargedDebts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND.
L.J. 36 (1971).
28. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 524(c), 92 Stat. 2549, 2592
(1979).
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debtor with postbankruptcy obligations that are the very obligations that
led to the bankruptcy filing in the first instance. 29 The statute was so
effective that creditor interests soon began a campaign to repeal it.3"
By 1984, these creditor interest groups had succeeded. Court approval
is no longer required, except in a few instances. Instead, the debtor's
attorney must file an affidavit with the court stating that the reaffirmation
(1) "represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement . . . " and (2)
"does not impose an undue hardship . . . ."3 This change in the statute
puts a debtor's counsel in a difficult position.
The possibility of
malpractice liability exists if an attorney unwisely supplies the necessary
affidavit.32 Nevertheless, one who refuses to supply the affidavit may
well end up with an unhappy client." Creditors opted for this new
arrangement because they believed that an attorney would not be as
effective in preventing unwise reaffirmation agreements as the completely
independent bankruptcy judge.
D. Ability to Pay
Prior to 1976, a debtor's financial condition was irrelevant in
determining either eligibility for discharge or the dischargeability of a
particular obligation.'
This began to change in 1976, and by 1984,
ability to pay had become a significant component of discharge policy.
The beginning of this change can be seen in the historical treatment
of educational debt. At one time fully dischargeable, educational loans
attracted legislative attention in the mid-seventies due to the rapidly rising
default rate for student borrowers. There was substantial sentiment in
Congress favoring complete nondischargeability. The final legislative
29. Debtors who wish to make post-bankruptcy payments can always do so. See 11
U.S.C. § 524(0 (1988). Reaffirmation agreements may make sense if the creditor is
threatening well-founded dischargeability litigation or has a security interest in essential
assets. Even then, however, the terms of the bargain must be examined closely.
30. Jeffrey W. Morris & Joseph E. Ulrich, Reaffirmation Under the Consumer
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: A Loser for All Concerned, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
111, 115 (1986).
31.
11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3).
32.
HENRY J. SOMMER & GARY KLEIN, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 14.5.2.3 (4th ed. 1992); see also Morris
& Ulrich, supra note 30, at 125-26.
33. Another possibility is to submit an affidavit that does not comply with the
statute. In re James, 120 B.R. 582, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990), criticizes this
practice.
34. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in
Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 112-16 (1982).
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product,35

however, represented a compromise between Congress and
those who had opposed disparate treatment of educational loans. Such
loans were nondischargeable for five years.
Within that period,
however, discharge was available if "payment from future income or
other wealth will impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his
dependents."36 Thus, ability to pay initially became relevant to discharge
policy only as an additional protection for debtors. Financial condition
was irrelevant to dischargability after five years had passed and, within
that initial period, any truly unfortunate student was entitled to an
immediate discharge.37
Soon the thinking about ability to pay changed. By the mid-eighties,
some debtors discovered that they were expected to earn their bankruptcy
discharge. Two circumstances combined to provide this new emphasis in
discharge policy: a dispute over the minimum level of payments in
chapter 13 proceedings and a dispute over the number of chapter 7
debtors who could make significant payments to creditors out of
postpetition earnings.
Recall that Congress created a set of incentives to encourage the use
of chapter 13 proceedings.3" As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978 did not spell out exactly what was required of debtors who filed
under that chapter. The only relevant confirmation standards were
requirements of "good faith 3 9 and payments to creditors "not less" than
what would be received under chapter 7.' Many debtors in no-asset
cases sought the broader discharge benefits of chapter 13 while not
making significant payments to creditors. Some courts confirmed "zero
payment" plans while others invoked the "good faith" requirement to
demand significant payments to creditors.4
The disposable income
requirement of § 1325(b)(1)(B) was added in 1984 to resolve the split in
authority. It establishes a minimum level of contribution from chapter 13
35.

For a brief history of the status of education obligations, see 3 COLLIER ON
supra note 12, 523.17.
36. The original student loan legislation was not part of the bankruptcy statute. See
20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1979).
37. For the current treatment of education obligations, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
The initial period of nondischargeability was increased from five to seven years by the
Crime Control Act § 3621. A separate provision controls the dischargeability of HEAL
loans. See 42 U.S.C. § 294F(g) (1988).
38. See supra text accompanying note 18.
BANKRUPTCY,

39.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988).

40.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).

41.

For a good discussion of the pre-1984 "good faith" decisions, see 5 COLLIER
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12,
1325.04(2).

ON
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debtors. The debtor who wants the more effective chapter 13 discharge
must pay for it with a commitment of "disposable income" over a full
three-year period. Debt relief, at least in chapter 13, must be earned. It
is not available as a matter of right.
During the same period (1978-1984), debtor and creditor interests
hotly debated the wisdom of a needs test for chapter 7 liquidations.
Creditors postulated that a substantial number of chapter 7 debtors could
make significant payments to creditors out of future income. In many
respects, this debate was a rehash of the earlier argument over whether
students could afford to repay educational loans out of future income.
This time, however, creditors were able to cite an empirical study
published by the Credit Research Center at Purdue University. This
study concluded that a needs threshold for chapter 7 bankruptcy would
result in a $1.1 billion annual payback to creditors out of future income."'
Although its methodology was sharply criticized,43 the Purdue study
influenced the course of the debate which eventually resulted in the
adoption of § 707(b). This provision creates an indirect needs test for
liquidation bankruptcy by mandating dismissal of a chapter 7 petition
whenever the debtor's future income will support significant repayments
to creditors."
Taken together, §§ 523(a)(8), 1325(b), and 707(b) represent a very
substantial shift in discharge policy. Although the language used is not
identical, each section requires consideration of the debtor's financial
condition. Administration of any ability to pay test often involves
judicial control of debtor conduct. Those who resort to bankruptcy are
forced to conform future activity to a bankruptcy judge's concept of need
rather than having eligibility for debt relief ordinarily determined by past
conduct4 or by the circumstances of debt creation.46
42.

1

CREDIT RESEARCH CTR.,

KRANNERT GRADUATE SCH.

OF MANAGEMENT,

PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY 90 (1982).

43. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy: An Analysis of the
Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091; see also A. Charlene Sullivan, Reply,
Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1069; Teresa A. Sullivan
et al., Rejoinder, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1087.
44. The statute requires dismissal of a liquidation proceeding if "the granting of
relief would be a substantial abuse of" chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). While "ability to
pay" is not the only component of substantial abuse, it is the most important one. See
United States Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding ability to pay
warrants finding of substantial abuse); In re Green, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding ability to pay included in "totality of circumstances" test).
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(10).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-(4), (6), (9), (10)-(12).
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II. EXEMPTIONS
Exemptions complement the bankruptcy discharge and provide
additional relief against collection activity. While the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 was in force, state law, primarily nonbankruptcy law, was the sole
source of exemption protection. 7 States were free to grant or deny
exemptions subject only to state constitutional limitations.48 States could
also fine tune exemption policy by allowing certain types of creditors to
reach otherwise exempt assets through liens and promissory waivers.49
The Bankruptcy Code changes many aspects of exemption law.
Nonbankruptcy law is modified in the following respects:
1. Debtors have the option of choosing federal bankruptcy
exemptions unless the state has vetoed this choice
through legislation.50 Thirty-six states have exercised
this veto power by opting to provide an exclusive list of
state exemptions."
2. Contractual waivers of exemption are invalid."
3. Certain judicial and consensual liens on otherwise
exempt assets can be avoided.53
4. Each debtor in a joint case is entitled to his/her exempt
assets. 5
5. Property exempted during bankruptcy is generally
protected against postbankruptcy collection activity by
creditors with claims that have not been discharged.55
6. Immune property interests arising out of joint asset
ownership are also protected in certain circumstances.56

47. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
48. Recently, a constitutional requirement of "wholesome laws, exempting a
reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale" has been invoked to invalidate an
unlimited exemption of retirement benefits. In re Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d 452 (Ind.
1993); see also In re Netz, 91 B.R. 503 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
49. JAMES A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 166-167
(1956).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
51. SOMMER & KLEIN, supra note 32, § 10.2.1 n.15.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 522(e).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B).
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It is arguable that the 1978 changes in exemption policy were even
more radical than the changes in discharge policy. The legitimacy of
some type of federal preemption of state law has long been accepted with
regard to discharge policy. Federal intervention in exemption disputes,
however, was an innovation of the 1978 legislation. Nevertheless, the
new exemption policy attracted less attention and generated less
controversy than the changes in discharge policy. Perhaps this is because
discharge rules provide the primary protection against creditor collection
activity in most states and thus receive the most attention. It is also likely
that conservative judicial constructions of the exemption provisions have
contributed to the relative lack of controversy.
Federal control of
exemption policy has been held to a minimum by restrictive
interpretations of the Code's exemption provisions.
The impact of this conservative approach can be seen in decisions
interpreting § 522(m) which allows both husband and wife to claim
exempt assets. In some states, there is only one homestead exemption
per household. Section 522(m) seems to override state law and allow
both husband and wife to claim a complete homestead exemption. 7
Nonetheless, most cases reach the opposite result, reasoning that a state
which vetoes the use of the federal exemption list also opts out of the
special protective provisions such as § 522(m). 8 Similar reasoning
appears in cases interpreting § 522(f)."
The analysis in all these
decisions, however, was repudiated by the Supreme Court in Owen v.
Owen.' In Owen, the Court decided that North Carolina's veto of the
federal exemption list was not controlling in determining whether the
debtor had the right under § 522(f) to avoid a judicial lien on his
otherwise exempt homestead."' Courts have been slow to recognize the
57. SOMMER & KLEIN, supra note 32, § 10.2.3.1.
58. See, e.g., Stevens v. Pike County Bank, 829 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1987); In re
Granger, 754 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902 (8th
Cir. 1983); see also In re Pruitt, 829 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding only one-half
of homestead exemption available in a single bankruptcy).
59. See, e.g., In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
60. 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
61. As the Court in Owen explained,
Just as it is not inconsistent with the policy of permitting state-defined
exemptions to have another policy disfavoring waiver of exemptions,
whether federal- or state-created; so also it is not inconsistent to have
a policy disfavoring the impingement of certain types of liens upon
exemptions, whether federal- or state-created. We have no basis for
pronouncing the opt-out policy absolute, but must apply it along with
whatever other competing or limiting policies the statute contains.
(continued)
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impact of Owen on exemption policy.62 As the significance of that
decision becomes more widely understood and accepted, § 522 will
provide greater protection for debtors. Once this occurs, Owen will
become as much a target of creditor lobbying activity as the original 1978
legislation applicable to reaffirmation agreements.
One aspect of exemption policy has been controversial for some time.
The courts are sharply divided63 on the issue of whether the prebankruptcy purchase of exempt property (often immediately before the
petition) is a fraudulent conveyance either because the transaction was
intended to hinder collection activity' or because the consideration
received (the exempt asset) was not adequate.' 5 The Bankruptcy Code
does nothing to resolve the controversy. According to both the House
and Senate Reports, "[A]s under current law, the debtor will be permitted
to convert non-exempt property into exempt property before filing a
bankruptcy petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and
permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is
entitled under the law.,6
There are two ways to read this fragment of legislative history. One
interpretation is that debtors have always had an absolute right to acquire
exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy, and adoption of the
Bankruptcy Code does not change this right. Another interpretation is
that the law is unchanged concerning the extent to which exempt property
can be purchased on the eve of bankruptcy. Courts have chosen the
second view, sometimes condemning and sometimes condoning purchases
of exempt assets. Decisions tend to be very fact sensitive and there are

Id. at 313.
62. See, e.g., In re Moreland, 21 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994). But cf. In re Maddox,
15 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding debtor could use § 522(0 to avoid nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest in property exempt from seizure under Mississippi
law, even though that lien fell within state law exception to such exemption).
63. Compare In re Beckman, 104 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (denying
exemption) with Doethlaff v. Penn Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 1941)
(allowing exemption).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The purchase of an asset,
because of its exemptible characteristics, is evidence of an intent to hinder creditors.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)-(B)(i).
Even if the purchase price is fair, the
consideration received is not adequate from a creditor's perspective. An asset subject to
creditor claims has been exchanged for an asset which is not subject to creditor claims.
66. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6316-17; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5861-62.
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few clear cut rules governing this area of bankruptcy jurisprudence. As
one bankruptcy judge has wearily observed:
After practicing 40 years with these holdings, I humbly
suggest that when the conduct of the debtor so offends
the sensibility of a court that it cannot accept the
exemption, that court presumes an exception to the
constitutional provision that is completely contrary to its
plain language. Because the factual permutations are
infinite and the sensibility levels of courts nearly so, I do
not see the emergence of a definitive rule anytime soon.67
A second fact pattern that may also be controversial involves intrafamily rearrangement of assets to maximize exemption protection. The
most likely scenario features a husband and wife planning to file a joint
bankruptcy case. Each spouse is entitled to a separate exemption claim
in jointly owned assets.68 If an automobile is titled only in the name of
one spouse, it may be possible to double the motor vehicle exemption by
converting the title to joint ownership.69 Although no reported decisions
deal with this maneuver, it would seem to be no less controversial than
purchases of exemptible property from third parties on the eve of
bankruptcy.
Finally, debtor migration in search of better exemption laws is now
beginning to come under judicial scrutiny. For the debtor who chooses
nonbankruptcy exemptions, whether by choice or compulsion, the
controlling state law is that of his or her domicile in the 180 days
immediately preceding bankruptcy." Debtors possessing the ability to
move have an incentive to migrate from stingy states to generous
jurisdictions. Florida, for example, places an acreage but no dollar limit
on its homestead exemption" and is a popular destination for bankruptsto-be.' These migration cases raise new questions that include whether a
67.

In re Primack, 89 B.R. 954, 958-59 n.5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (mem.).

68. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m).
69. SOMMER & KLEIN, supra note 32, § 10.2.2.2. The text uses the example of a
jointly owned automobile to illustrate the interaction between § 522(m) and § 522(d)(2).
The latter allows exemption of "the debtor's interest . . . in one motor vehicle."

§ 522(d)(2). The same result would occur if the debtor were restricted to the exemptions
provided by state law. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(2)(b) (Anderson
1993) (allowing the exemption of the person's interest in one motor vehicle).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
71.

FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4.

72. There are only a few reported exemption migration decisions. All involve an
attempt to take advantage of the generous Florida homestead provision. See, e.g., In re
(continued)
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change of domicile actually occurred 73 and whether the relocation was
part of a fraudulent scheme.'
All of the exemption acquisition decisions provide little guidance for
bankruptcy planners because the fundamental concepts involved in these
cases cannot be reconciled. Exemption law permits what fraudulent
conveyance law condemns. In order for a coherent body of doctrine to
exist, one concept must prevail. Neither the courts nor Congress have
yet shown any interest in either unqualified approval or consistent
condemnation of exempt property acquisition on the eve of bankruptcy.
Therefore, the debate in this particular area of exemption policy is likely
to continue.
III. BANKRUPTCY-BASED DISCRIMINATION
The prohibition against bankruptcy-based discrimination is the third
important component of the fresh start policy. It is also the newest and
least developed aspect of this policy.
In 1971, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona statute which
permitted denial of driving privileges to debtors who failed to satisfy
claims which had been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. The
Court in Perez v. Campbell' announced a rule that today protects debtors
against discriminatory acts 76 by both public and private entities.
Perez was decided while the Bankruptcy Commission was preparing
its report. The Commission recommended that any new statute contain a
very broad prohibition of discrimination by all entities.'
The final
legislative product, however, is much narrower than the Commission's
proposal. As originally enacted, § 525 applied only to governmental
units .7 A 1984 amendment79 added a prohibition against employment
discrimination by private entities.

Schwarb, 150 B.R. 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992). There are other jurisdictions which do
not place a dollar cap on the homestead exemption. See Donna L.. Seiden, JudicialLien
Avoidance and the Homestead Exemption, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 319, 323 (1994).
These jurisdictions, however, do not have as favorable weather conditions as Florida.
73. See, e.g., In re Ring, 144 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
74. See, e.g., In re Coplan, 156 B.R. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
75. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
76. Perez is not a routine debt collection case. The state was not a creditor and was
not acting as an agent for a creditor.

77.

REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 177, pt. 2, at 143-45 (1973).
78. This part of the statute is now 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
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Section 525 has only been moderately effective in preventing and
redressing intentional discriminatory activity that undercuts the value of a
bankruptcy discharge. There is disagreement concerning the exact
content of the anti-discrimination rules. This disagreement is reflected in
an on-going debate over the most desirable technique of statutory
interpretation.
Because the original version of § 525 only prohibited discrimination
by public entities, some courts, including the Seventh Circuit,"0 have
refused to apply § 525 to discriminatory activity by private entities.
Furthermore, although the addition of § 525(b) expands the statutory
protection by prohibiting employment discrimination by private actors,
the statutory interpretation controversy continues because many forms of
bankruptcy-based discrimination are not explicitly condemned under the
current language. Courts follow one of two views concerning the proper
approach to interpret this provision. Some courts are willing to prohibit
discrimination not explicitly condemned as long as the prohibition is
consistent with statutory policy.8 ' Other courts refuse to condemn the
activity unless it is explicitly mentioned in § 525.82 For example, one
court recently refused to find a cause of action under § 525(b) when the
plaintiff alleged a termination of employment in anticipation of a
bankruptcy filing. The court noted that the statute protected only past
and present debtors and not individuals who have yet to file a bankruptcy
petition. "
This divergence" in the application of § 525 is probably permanent.
The federal judiciary, like the general public, has differing opinions
concerning the desirability of debt relief. Judges less sympathetic to the
concept of a bankruptcy discharge are likely to continue to adopt a
conservative approach to interpreting § 525.
80. Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985). This
decision is criticized in Douglass G. Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy-Based
Discrimination,62 IND. L.J. 159, 167-69 (1987-88).
81. See, e.g., McNeely v. Hutchinson Fin. Corp. (In re McNeely), 82 B.R. 628
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987) (finding discrimination against independent contractor not
permissible).
82. See, e.g., Madison Madison Int'l v. Matra, S.A. (In re Madison Madison
Int'l), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (prohibiting discrimination against
independent contractor).
83. Kanouse v. Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. (In re Kanouse), 168 B.R. 441,
447 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
84. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 66 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 387, 393-97 (1992) (discussing these competing approaches to statutory
interpretation).
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CONCLUSION

At least with regard to the provisions applicable to consumer
bankruptcies, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is an anachronism.
Although the Act was drafted during the presidency of Richard Nixon
and signed into law by Jimmy Carter, its aggressive protection of
consumer debtors seems more in harmony with the sentiments of Lyndon
Johnson's "Great Society." The anachronistic aspect of this legislation
explains why attempts to roll back some of the debtor protection
provisions closely followed its enactment. On September 28, 1980, less
than a year after the statute's effective date, The New York Times
reported that there were creditor complaints about the ease of obtaining
debt relief.'
Twelve months later, the campaign to reduce debtor
protection was in full swing. 6 The result was the enactment of procreditor legislation in 1984,' 1986,8 and 1990.89
The struggle continues. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994' was
passed by Congress on October 6, 1994. This legislation contains
provisions applicable to consumer debtors, some of which are helpful and
others which are harmful. While the Act is a mixed bag, its most
significant provisions would impair or eliminate important debtor
protections."

85. It's Getting Easier to Beat the Bill Collector, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1980, § 3,
at 15.
86. Lobbying Intensifies Over Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1981, at D.
87. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333.
88. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
89. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789.
90. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
91. See id. § 302 (adding criminal fines as a nondischargeable debt under
§ 1328(a)(3).

